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THE TENDER TRAP: STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES
AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONALITY
DIANE S. WILNER* AND CRAIG A. LANDY**
I. INTRODUCTION
N THE last decade, tender offers' have become a common method
for acquiring control of publicly held corporations, because they are
less expensive and less time-consuming than traditional acquisition
devices such as negotiated mergers, gradual market acquisition, or the
proxy system of gaining control. 2 Tender offers have been viewed by
some as "reckless corporate raids on 'proud old companies' -13 and by
others as a method of promoting society's best interests "by providing
[a] method of removing entrenched but inefficient management."4
* Ms. Wilner received her B.S. and M.A. from the City College of New York and her J.D.
magna cum laude from Brooklyn Law School. She is a member of the New York Bar and is
associated with the New York firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom.
** B.A., Manhattan College; J.D., Fordham University School of Law. Mr. Landy is
associated with the New York firm of Olwine, Connelly, Chase, O'Donnell & Weyher.
1. A tender offer may be defined as a public invitation extended to all (or a class) of the
shareholders of a company (the "target') to sell their shares to an offeror, during a fixed period of
time, at a specified price. See Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisitions By Tender Offer,
115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 317 (1967). The offer requests a transfer of securities in return for cash or
other securities generally valued at a higher market price than the sought-after shares. Note, The
Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 Harv. L
Rev. 1250, 1251 (1973).
2. Takeovers Applying "Unfriendly" Persuasion, Time, Dec. 15, 1975, at 58. Over 100 offers
were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission during each of the past three fiscal
years. Rattner, States Acting to Put Curb on Takeovers, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1976, at 41, col. 8.
In 1960, only eight cash tender offers involved corporations with securities listed on national
securities exchanges, whereas the number rose to 107 in 1966. E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, Tender Offers
For Corporate Control 65 n.3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Control]. Depressed market
conditions may have accounted for the increase in takeover attempts, since an offeror can pay a
premium above the market price for shares of a profitable company and still get a good return on
its money. But the proliferation of offers may well continue despite overall market improvement.
See Robinson, Tender Offers: Some Facts and Fancies, 175 N.Y.L.J., May 17, 1976, at 1, col. 2;
4, col. 1. Even when market prices rise they may remain well below asset value. See Ruthlessness
By The Rules, Forbes, Feb. 1, 1976, at 28, col. 2. Explanations for the increase in the number of
cash tender offers during the 1960's center around such economic elements as the increase in
corporate liquidity, availability of credit, and low market prices for securities, all of which make
transfers attractive. Furthermore, corporate leaders were acquiring increased sophistication
regarding tender offer techniques and recognized the utility of tender offers in promoting the
smooth transfer of corporate power while avoiding the expense, discord and accusations which
often accompany proxy contests. Moreover, the scope of federal and state regulation of tender
offers was limited. Corporate Control, supra, at 65-66.
3. Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 767
(1971).
4. Id. at 767-68.
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Apart from such partisan views, voiced by incumbent executives on
one hand and corporate bargain-hunters on the other, tender offers,
like other securities transactions, are prone to abuse and hence soon
became the subject of extensive Congressional scrutiny. Federal regu-
lation of cash5 tender offers began with the Williams Act, 6 which
Congress adopted in 1968 as an amendment to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 7 The Williams Act was designed primarily to protect
investors by providing for full disclosure of the material terms of offers
and other material information concerning the companies involved,
without favoring either the offeror or the management of the target
company.8
5. Until the Williams Act, see note 7 infra, became law, a cash tender offer for all the voting
shares of a corporation, or enough to constitute control, was no different in law from an offer to
purchase a single share under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1970).
Exchange offers, however, in which the consideration to be paid for the target's shares Is either
debt or equity shares of another corporation, have long been subject to federal regulation. This Is
so since they constitute an offer to sell, making the offeror an underwriter within section 2 of the
1933 Act, or, if newly issued securities are used, registration may be required by section 5 of that
Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, e (1970). Exchange offers are similarly affected by state blue sky laws,
under which advance registration is frequently required. See I L. Loss, Securities Regulation 49
ff. (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. See also note 20 infra.
6. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1970)).
7. The first comprehensive legislative plan to control tender offers was introduced in Congress
in 1965 by Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey. S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). In
1968, Congress passed and President Johnson signed into law provisions popularly known as the
Williams Act, instituting federal regulation of tender offers for securities within federal regula-
tion. The Williams Act provides for disclosure of certain information by an offeror where It
appears that the purpose of the tender offer is a corporate takeover.
The Williams Act specifically addresses itself to the earlier ills that plagued shareholders of
target corporations. Section 3(d)(5) permits shareholders, depositing securities pursuant to a
tender offer, to withdraw their securities until seven days after the offer is first published or after
sixty days if the securities have neither been purchased nor returned. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1970).
Also, if more shares than have been called for are tendered, in a tender calling for less than all
outstanding securities, the offerr must prorate the sale among all shares tendered during the first
ten days of the offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1970). The latter section, governing proration, has
been held to require that an offer calling for less than all outstanding shares must be held open at
least ten days. MGM, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
The offeror may find that the offer is not being accepted due to the rise in the market price for the
target's securities, and will consequently raise the offering price. The Act requires that such
increase be retroactive to all tendering shareholders, regardless of when the tender offer was
made. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1970). Finally, in construing 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970), the courts
have extended to persons defrauded in tender offers the same remedies they have made available
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and rule
10b-5 pursuant thereto, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976). See, e.g., Dyer v. Eastern Trust &
Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 914 (D. Me. 1971); cf., e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,
422 U.S. 49 (1975).
8. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968); S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1967).
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The disclosure provisions of the Williams Act require the offeror to
file information, listed in schedule 13D, 9 with the SEC identifying its
background, the source and amount of consideration being offered, its
purpose in the transaction, and other interests presently held in the
target company. The Act, as amended,10 applies when a tender offer
could result in the direct or indirect ownership of more than five
percent of any class of equity securities (1) registered under section 12
of the Securities Exchange Act,"' or (2) issued by an insurance com-
pany which would have been required to register except for the
exemption contained in section 12(g)(2)(G) of that Act,' 2 or (3) issued
by a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940.13 If, together with all acquisitions made during
the preceding twelve months, the tender offer can result in the
ownership of no more than two percent of a class of securities, the
offer is exempt from the disclosure requirements. 14 A company's
attempt to repurchase its own securities is also exempt, as are those
tender offers granted exemption pursuant to SEC rules, where no
threat of an attempted takeover is present.15
State regulation of securities transactions occurring within the bor-
ders of the state predates federal regulation. State "blue sky" laws
require full disclosure by issuers and regulate the activities of persons
through whom securities are purchased or sold. 16 Recently, however,
many states have also enacted "takeover statutes" which inject a new
element into both the regulation and the strategy of tender offers. This
Article examines existing state takeover statutes, their impact upon
tender offers, and their constitutionality.
II. STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES
At this writing, 23 states have enacted tender offer legislation. 17 In
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1976).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), n(d) (1970).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
12. Id. § 781(g)(2)(G).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970).
14. Id. § 78n(d)(8)(A).
15. Id. §§ 78n(d)(8)(B), (C).
16. See Loss, supra note 5, at 30-68; Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of
Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 767, 768 (1971); notes 112-17 infra and accompan)ing text.
17. Alaska: Alaska Stat- §§ 45.57.010-. 120 (1 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 5 6029-6029K (June 8,
1976)).
Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 11-51.5-101 to -108 (1 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 19151-57
(July 1, 1975)).
Connecticut Pub. Act No. 76-362 (1 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 10,151-164 (June 2, 1976)).
Delaware: Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203 (1 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 11,131 (May 1, 1976)).
Hawaii: Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 417E-1 to -15 (Supp. 1975) (effective May 24, 1974).
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addition, one state is considering takeover legislation,18 and a "model
business takeover act" is being proposed this year by the Council of
State Governments. 19 Finally, some states have interpreted their blue
sky laws to apply to interstate tender offers. 20 Some of the takeover
Idaho: Idaho Code §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (Supp. 1975) (effective July 1, 1975).
Indiana: Ind. Code §§ 23-2-3-1 to -12 (Supp. 1976) (effective May 1, 1975).
Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-1276 to -1285 (1974) (effective July 1, 1974).
Kentucky: House Bill No. 349 (1A CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 1 20,131-139 (July 1, 1976)).
Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. §§ 51:1500-1512 (1A CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 4 21,151-162 (June
28, 1976)).
Maryland: Md. Ann. Code §§ 11-901 to -908 (lA CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 23,421-428 (July 1,
1976)).
Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. l0C, §§ 1-13 (1A CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 19 24,261-273
(May 22, 1976)).
Michigan: Pub. Act No. 179 (lA CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. V9 25,341-357 (July 1, 1976)).
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 80B.01-13 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (effective May 18, 1973).
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 78.376-3778 (1973) (effective 1969).
New York: N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law art. 16, added by Assembly Bill No. 11874-A, approved July
29, 1976 (effective Sept. 1, 1976).
Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1975) (effective Oct. 9, 1969).
Pennsylvania: Pub. L. No. 1106 (2 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 4 41,181-196 (March 3, 1976)).
South Dakota: S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 47-32-1 to -47 (Codified Laws Supp. 1976) (effective
July 1, 1975).
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-2101 to -2115 (3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. $$ 45,191-205
(March 17, 1976)).
Utah: Senate Bill No. 10, §§ 1-15 (3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 1 47,331-345 (Feb. 5, 1976)).
Virginia: Va. Code Ann. §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1973) (effective March 5, 1968).
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 552.01-25 (Spec. Pamphlet 1975) (effective July 1, 1972).
18. The New Jersey legislature considered such provisions during its 1975-1976 session, but
did not enact them. Senate Bill No. 808 (1976 Sess.).
19. Wall St. J., June 24, 1976, at 1, col. 5. The model act is said to be patterned on the
Indiana statute, Ind. Code §§ 23-2-3-1 to -12 (Supp. 1976).
20. The blue sky laws generally prohibit fraud in connection with a purchase as well as a sale
of securities. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 25401 (West Supp. 1976). Several states' blue sky laws
also appear to be subject to interpretations making their registration or disclosure requirements
applicable to tender offers made by foreign corporations. The Mississippi securities division, for
example, has a policy of "requirfing] registration by qualification of all companies making tender
offers to residents of Mississippi." Letter of Ben Hawkins, Deputy Secretary of State, March 10,
1976 (on file at Fordham Law Review). Similarly, New Mexico's law, e.g., requires registration
as a broker-dealer by any nonresident who directs more than fifteen offers to state residents
within twelve months. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 48-18-17B (1966). Montana's act is virtually
identical. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 15-2004(3) (1967). The Illinois Securities Division has
proposed an interim rule to clarify its view that the state' securities laws apply to a cash offer for
its own shares made by any issuer to resident shareholders. The rule is meant "to cover the period
between [its date] and when appropriate legislation can be enacted[, i.e.] during the calendar
year 1977." Letter of David Hart Wunder, Illinois Securities Commissioner, July 20, 1976 (on file
at Fordham Law Review). This proposed rule 295 is entitled "Definition, for certain purposes, of
the term 'employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud in connection with the sale or purchase
of any security as used in Section 121 (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.12 (Supp. 1973)],' " It
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statutes have been in effect since 1969, but they had little impact until
the past year. 21
A. Provisions of the Statutes
Although takeover statutes vary considerably, there are some
characteristics common to all. A takeover offer is usually defined as an
offer to acquire any equity security of a target company, if after the
acquisition the offeror would be directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of a specified percentage22 of any class of the outstanding equity
securities of the target company.23 The applicability of a takeover
statute to a particular tender offer depends on such factors as whether
the target company (1) is incorporated within the state in question, or
(2) has its principal place of business there, and/or2 4 (3) has substantial
assets located within the state.25
Some tender offers that fit the above definition are exempt from the
provisions of the statutes. Presently there are fourteen specific types of
exemptions: 26
(1) An offer to acquire any equity securities, if the acquisition,
together with all other acquisitions by the same person of securities of
the same class during the preceding twelve months would not exceed
provides that an issuer whose securities are registered under the state securities act or the
Securities Act of 1933 and are held of record by at least 100 state residents, who constitute at least
20% of all holders of record, may not make a tender offer for its own shares without twenty days'
pre-effective notice, if the offer's effect would be to permit the issuer to delist its shares from a
national exchange or from being quoted over-the-counter, or to terminate registration of the
securities.
21. See notes 60-64 infra and accompanying text.
22. The percentages specified vary between 5% and 20% with most states using 10%.
23. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-51.5-102(13) (1 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 5 9152 (July
1, 1975)).
24. In some states the language of the statute is in the disjunctive and in others it is in the
conjunctive. Although it might appear that where the conjunctive is used both elements must be
present to trigger the statute this is not necessarily so. In Copperweld Corp. v. Societe Imetal, 75
Civ. 09-3868 (C.P. Franklin County, Ohio, Oct. 9, 1975), the Ohio statute, written in the
conjunctive, was interpreted by the Attorney General of Ohio to equate "substantial assets" with
"principal place of business." See notes 71-73 infra and accompanying text.
25. Section 2(a) of the Connecticut Act, Pub. Act No. 76-362 (1 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep.
10,151-64 (June 2, 1976)), provides other bases for applicability, i.e., when a target company has
"its principal executive offices" or "a majority of its business operations"-an elusive concept-in
the state.
26. No statute contains all of the exemptions and two statutes contain significant exemptions
not found in the others. The Kansas takeover statute, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1276 (1974), does not
apply to any corporation registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Delaware
Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203(d) (1 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 11,131 (May 1, 1976)), states that
any Delaware corporation may provide in its certificate of incorporation that takeover bids for its
shares shall not be governed by the section.
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two percent of that class (Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsyl-
vania, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin). 27
(2) An offer made by an issuer to acquire (a) its own securities; 28 or,
in some states, (b) securities of a subsidiary of which at least two-thirds
(fifty-one percent in some states) of the voting securities are owned
beneficially by such issuer (Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin).
(3) An offer to acquire equity securities of a class not registered
pursuant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Col-
orado, Nevada, Utah, Virginia).
(4) An offer to acquire equity securities effected by a registered
broker-dealer on a stock exchange or in the over-the-counter market, if
the broker performs only the customary broker's function and neither
the broker nor the principal solicits or arranges for the solicitation of
orders to sell such equity securities (Michigan) and the broker receives
no more than the customary broker's commission (Alaska, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia).
(5) An offer to acquire equity securities where the target company
recommends that the shareholders accept the offer (Michigan, 29 Utah),
and the terms of which have been furnished to shareholders (Alaska,
Massachusetts), and which is made to all shareholders on equal terms
(Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,30 Maryland, Min-
nesota, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Wiscon-
sin).
(6) An offer which the state commissioner of securities31 shall
27. Such provisions are consistent with the Williams Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(6)(B),
n(d)(8)(A) (1970).
28. The Williams Act also exempts such transactions. Id. §§ 78m(d)(6)(C), n(d)(8)(B).
29. This exemption is significant in that the takeover statute, in effect, has no application to
friendly tender offers, whereas in many cases, it provides the target company's management with
a shield against unfriendly offers. One state, Michigan, appears to have done so at the expense of
offeree shareholders. The statute is ambiguous: if an offer is not exempt and thus is required to be
registered, the registration statement must disclose any negotiations or understandings with
management concerning future employment, or with shareholders concerning purchase of their
shares on terms different from those of the offer. However, any offer which is proposed to and
approved by management is exempt, and hence no registration statement need be filed. Mich.
Pub. Act No. 179, §§ 4(2)(d), 8(1)(0 (1A CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 25,344, 25,348 (July 1, 1976)).
30. The exemption is available in Louisiana "unless the target company is a natural resource
company." La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1500(11)(e) (1A CCH Blue SkyL. Rep. V 21,151 (June 28, 1976)).
31. The commissioners administer the filing and hearing requirements of the state statutes
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exempt by rule or order (Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Utah, Virginia). 31
(7) Isolated offers to purchase shares from individual stockholders,
not made to stockholders generally (Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, Nevada,
Ohio, Virginia, Wisconsin) or not made to more than thirty (Delaware)
or fifteen shareholders (Tennessee).
(8) An offer to exchange the securities of one issuer for the securities
of another issuer, if the offeror is registered or exempt under the
Securities Act of 1933 (Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee,
Wisconsin).
(9) An offer to purchase shares in accordance with a registration
statement under the Securities Act of 1933 (Massachusetts, Nevada). 33
(10) An offer to acquire shares of a corporation or of a class with less
than 100 shareholders (Alaska, Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Wisconsin) and (a) with less than one million
dollars in assets (Hawaii, Pennsylvania) or (b) when the offer is made
to all shareholders (Idaho).34
(11) Bids by a broker-dealer for his own account in the ordinary
course of business of buying and selling such securities (Idaho, In-
diana, Kansas, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin).
(12) Exchange offers not involving any public offering within the
meaning of section 4 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Idaho, Kentucky,
New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin).
(13) An offer for the sole account of the offeror made during any
period of twelve consecutive months to not more than ten persons in
the state (15 in Michigan and Tennessee, 25 in Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts and Pennsylvania, 50 in New York) and not for the purpose
of avoiding the statute (Idaho, South Dakota, Tennessee).
(14) An offer involving a class vote by stockholders of the target
company to approve a merger, consolidation, or sale of assets in
consideration of the issuance of securities of another corporation, or to
approve the sale of its securities in exchange for cash or securities of
another corporation (Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota,
and adopt rules and forms necessary to carry out the provisions of the statutes. See, e.g., Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 80B.07 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
32. This kind of provision parallels the federal Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8)(C) (1970), but is, of
course, rife with potential for conflict.
33. The Williams Act includes this exemption. Where such registration is made, the offeror is
voluntarily giving up the ability, afforded by the Williams Act, to avoid predisclosure. Id. §
78m(d)(6)(A).
34. This exemption lends support to the contention that takeover statutes are designed to
protect only large domestic companies, while leaving small, closely held corporations unaffected.
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Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Wisconsin), following a proxy solicita-
tion (Utah).
An examination of the various exemptions shows that most of these
statutes are aimed at regulating unfriendly tender offers35 directed at
larger companies. 36
If the tender offer is regulated by a takeover statute, the offeror is
required to file specified information with the designated state securi-
ties commission and to send copies to the target company, usually prior
to making the takeover bid. The offeror is usually required to file ten
days prior to its takeover bid, 3 7 but may be required to file as early as
thirty days prior to the effective date of the offer. 38 As a result of these
filing requirements, the effective date of the tender offer is delayed
beyond the initial date of disclosure and, in effect, a waiting period not
required by the Williams Act is imposed on the offeror.
The information required to be filed pursuant to takeover statutes 9
is, in some cases, similar to the disclosure requirements of schedule
13D 40 under the Williams Act.4 1 However, several states go substan-
tially beyond those requirements and provide that the offeror must file
a statement which is equivalent to the combined information on a
schedule 13D under the Williams Act and on a registration form S-1 42
under the Securities Act of 1933. 43
In addition to the waiting period imposed by the filing requirements,
takeover statutes often have other requirements that affect the time at
which a tender offer can be made. Most statutes provide that the
35. See exemptions (2) and (5).
36. See exemptions (3), (10) and (13).
37. Idaho Code § 30-1502 (Supp. 1975); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80B.02 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 78.3771 (1973); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 47-32-21 (Supp. 1976); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
552.03 (Spec. Pamphlet 1975).
38. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1277 (1974).
39. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80B.02 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.3771
(1973).
40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1976); see N.Y. Times, July 15, 1976, at 51, col. 6.
41. Corporate Control, supra note 2, at 60-61.
42. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1976).
43. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1707.041(B)(3) (Page Supp. 1975); Ind. Code § 23-2-3-2(c)
(Supp. 1976). "Thus, in line with the S-1 requirements, the offeror is required to disclose complete
information on its organization and operations, including, among other items, financial state-
ments for the current period and for the three most recent annual accounting periods, a brief
description of the location and general character of its principal physical properties, a description
of all but routine litigation, a brief description of the general business development of the offeror
and its subsidiaries during the past five years (as well as projected future developments), and
biographical summaries of all directors and officers together with disclosure of any material
interest of any director or officer in any material transaction during the preceding three years or In
any proposed material transaction to which the offeror or any of its subsidiaries was or is to be a
party." Corporate Control, supra note 2, at 159.
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designated securities commission may hold a hearing on the adequacy
of disclosures to be made and, in some instances, on the fairness of the
terms of the tender offer. Upon request by the target company the
hearing may become mandatory. 44 As a result of the hearing, registra-
tion of a tender offer will be delayed and may be denied by the state
securities commission.
Takeover statutes also contain enforcement provisions and remedies.
Many statutes empower the securities commission to issue cease and
desist orders or to seek or issue injunctions. 45 A violation of these
statutes may result in the imposition of a fine, imprisonment, or
both.4 6 Offerees are granted civil remedies 47 in the form of rescission
or damages.
B. The Effect of State Takeover Statutes
The most obvious effect of takeover statutes is the delay that
probably Will occur, particularly if a hearing procedure is invoked.
Although a state securities commission may ultimately approve the
tender offer, the target will have succeeded in eliminating the offeror's
critical advantage of surprise and speed. For example, the Indiana
takeover statute48 provides that a hearing must be held within 20
days of the hearing order (the hearing order should be issued within 20
days of filing by the offeror) and a determination must be made within
60 days of the conclusion of the hearing. Thus, a target company could
conceivably delay the tender offer by approximately one hundred days
by simply requesting a hearing. 49 The target company may choose to
44. See, e.g., S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 47-32-23 (Supp. 1976); Minn. StaL Ann. 80B.03
(Cum. Supp. 1976); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 417E-3(g) (Supp. 1975); Ind. Code § 23-2-3-2(e) (Supp.
1976). These statutes authorize the state securities commissioner, as part of his examination of the
registration statement of an offeror, to deny or condition the effectiveness of a takeover if he finds
the offer unfair to the offerees. Consequently, a shareholder's opportunity to take advantage of
the offered price may be blocked by the decision of an official of a state with whom the holder has
little or no connection. But see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.376 et seq. (1973); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
11.51.5-108 (1 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 9158 (July 1, 1975)); and Conn. Pub. Act No. 76-362 (1
CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 10,156 (June 2, 1976)), which do not provide for a hearing, and Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 1707.041(B)(1)(b) (Page Supp. 1975), which gives the state agency discretion to
refuse to hold a requested hearing.
45. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-51.5-108 (1 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 9158 (July 1,
1975)); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203(e) (1 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 11,131 (May 1, 1976)), Va.
Code Ann. § 13.1-535 (1973); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 552.17 (Spec. Pamphlet 1975).
46. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203(e) (I CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 11,131 (May 1,
1976)); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 110C, § 9(f) (1A CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 24,269 (May 22, 1976)).
47. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1283 (1974); Ind. Code § 23-2-3-10 (Supp. 1976); Md.
Ann. Code § 11-906 (1A CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 23,426 (July 1, 1976)).
48. Ind. Code §§ 23-2-3-2(e), (f) (lA CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 17,152 (May 1, 1975)).
49. Id. The magnitude of this delay is not unusual. Cf., e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. I10C, §§
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do this in the hope that the tender offer will die a natural death,50 or in
order to gain time to defend itself against the tender offer."1 A target's
most effective defensive tactic is to stall for time, allowing market
forces to make it economically undesirable for shareholders to relin-
quish their securities. 5 2
A public announcement of a tender offer will stimulate open-market
purchase of the target's securities by present shareholders or
speculators expecting to realize a quick profit on their short term
investment.5 3 Active trading will raise the price of the target's securi-
ties, and, as the market price draws closer to the tender offer price, the
economic incentive for shareholders to sell their stock will fade.5 4
Furthermore, as the margin narrows between the market and tender
offer prices, shareholders may be more receptive to management's
appeals not to sell and to support the status quo through a combination
of loyalty and lack of economic incentive.55
A second effect of these statutes, noted with disapproval in a New
York Stock Exchange study, is that the potential for delay can increase
the likelihood of irregular price fluctuations.5 6 Price fluctuations in the
market sometimes cause the SEC to halt trading in the target security
6-7 (1A CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 24,266-67 (May 22, 1976)) (150 days); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
1707.041(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1975) (100 days).
50. The Kentucky Act, House Bill No. 349 (1976), acknowledged this in its title: "An Act
relating to the prevention of take-over bids . .. .
51. Once a tender offer is underway, a target company may use a number of defensive
measures to block the takeover. The target may buy its own stock and thereby raise the market
price, declare an inflated dividend, merge with a friendly corporation, or solicit allied corpora-
tions to purchase its securities. The target may also attack the tender offer on antitrust grounds.
See, e.g., Muskegon Piston Ring Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 328 F.2d 830 (6th Cir.
1964); Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v. Amedco, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Corenco
Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, [1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,108 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 488 F.2d 207 (2d
Cir. 1973). The offer may also be challenged on the ground of nonconformity with other
applicable regulatory statutes. See Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition By Tender
Offer, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 317, 322 (1967). Indeed, potential antitrust problems may be arranged
at the last moment by a potential target. See, e.g., Ruthlessness By The Rules, Forbes, Feb. 1,
1976, at 26, 27.
52. Ruthlessness By The Rules, Forbes, Feb. 1, 1976, at 24, 28, col. 3 (urges statutory
delays); Robinson, Tender Offers: Some Facts and Fancies, 175 N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1976, at 1,
col. 2, 4, col. 1.
53. Corporate Control, supra note 2, at 173-91. Indeed, arbitrageurs may have the decisive
role in the success of tender offers. See Ruthlessness By The Rules, Forbes, Feb. 1, 1976, at 25.
54. Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1968, at 32, col. 1.
55. See Comment, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47
So. Cal. L. Rev. 1133 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Commerce Clause Limitations].
56. A New York Stock Exchange review of the Ohio Act is summarized in BNA Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. No. 1, at A-12 (June 4, 1969).
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between the time when the offer is filed and when it is published.5 7
This can have adverse nationwide impact 8 and surely injects uncer-
tainty into the situation. Conflicts among the substantive provisions of
the present takeover statutes have already caused delays, price fluctua-
tions and the possibility of suspension of trading. The enactment of
takeover statutes by more states will impede the SEC's control and
effective supervision of the market and increase the uncertainty of
shareholders.5 9 The uncertainty generated by the state statutes is
demonstrated by an examination of the few recent cases that have
applied these statutes.
Prior to the recent flurry of activity involving state takeover statutes,
the authors' discussions with officials in many state securities divisions
revealed that only one unfriendly tender offer made prior to the fall of
1975 had failed because of a state takeover statute. 60 In an Ohio filing
in 1971, the offeror, prior to the expiration of the waiting period, had
commenced the tender offer outside of Ohio for securities of an Ohio
corporation. When the securities division did not order a hearing, the
target sued in state court to obtain restraining orders, injunctions and
a hearing. 61 The lower court ordered a hearing;62 on appeal injunctive
relief was granted and the statutory procedures were upheld. 63 The
tender offer was ultimately withdrawn. 64
Prior to 1975, when targets began to use takeover statutes effec-
tively, the offeror had to be concerned primarily with maintaining
secrecy prior to making its bid, and with the schedule 13D require-
ments. 65 Now the offeror must also be concerned with one or more
state takeover statutes which may have serious adverse effects upon
57. Id. at A-12.
58. Public confidence in the integrity of the securities markets may be undermined, if not lost,
and stockholders would (temporarily) be denied a market for their securities.
59. Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 55, at 1165.
60. In In Re E-Z Paintr Corp. and Newell Cos., 3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. J 71,063 (Wisc.
1973), an offer was first filed in Wisconsin on December 5, 1972. After a review and five da)s of
hearings by the Commissioner of Securities the offer became effective on January 30, 1973. The
offer, though opposed by the target, was ultimately successful. A number of filings took place
under state statutes in this period in Virginia and Minnesota but no hearings were held,
apparently since the offers were "friendly."
61. Sparton Corp. v. Ward, Nos. 243, 230 (C.P., Franklin County, Ohio, Jan. 8, 1971). The
facts in this unreported case are reviewed in Corporate Control, supra note 2, at 161-62.
62. Id.
63. Sparton Corp. v. Ward, No. 71-8 (Ct. App., Franklin County, Ohio, Jan. 12, 1971).
64. Corporate Control, supra note 2, at 162.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1976). A false or misleading statement or omission concerning
material facts in a schedule 13D could result in an injunction against the tender offer. See
generally Note, Tender Offer Regulation-Injunction Standards Under the Williams Act, 45
Fordham L. Rev. 51 (1976).
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the offer. This is exemplified by two recent cases in which state
takeover statutes caused considerable delay: Copperweld Corp. v.
Imeta166 and Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp.67
On September 9, 1975, Societe Imetal, a French concern, filed a
schedule 13D with the SEC and made a tender offer for shares of the
Copperweld Corporation, a Pittsburgh-based producer of specialty
steels. In its verified complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging a variety of violations of
Federal law, 68 Copperweld's president stated that its principal place of
business was Pittsburgh. Of its seven wholly owned subsidiaries, two
were incorporated under the laws of Ohio, two were incorporated
under the laws of Pennsylvania, and three were incorporated in
Delaware.
As a foreign corporation, Copperweld was not required to be
licensed in Ohio merely because of its ownership of shares in two Ohio
corporations. The ownership of these shares did not make Copperweld
the owner of any operating assets in Ohio; nor did it constitute doing
business in the state.69 Approximately one year after the incorporation
of its two Ohio subsidiaries, Copperweld itself surrendered its license
to transact business as a foreign corporation in Ohio.
When the tender offer was announced, Copperweld "fought hard to
stave off a takeover by Societe Imetal[;] Copperweld executives op-
posed the bid in court, [and] employees staged placard-waving demon-
strations pleading that the company stay American-owned. '70 But the
Ohio statute was by far the strongest weapon the target had, and the
statute was used to obtain considerable delays.
The Ohio takeover statute applies to tender offers for a company
which either was incorporated in Ohio or has its principal place of
business in Ohio, and which has substantial assets within Ohio. One
might reason, therefore, that the statute would not apply in this case,
66. 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975). See generally Wysocki, The Delaying Game, Wall St.
J., Nov. 19, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
67. 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). A recent suit challenging a state takeover statute was
instituted on August 23, 1976 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The
plaintiff, Thrall Manufacturing Company, sought "to enjoin Ohio officials from continuing to
interfere with its offer to pay $14 a share for up to 625,000 shares of [an Ohio corporation,] the
Youngstown Steel Door Company." N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1976, at 51, col. 3. The complaint
included allegations that the Ohio statute unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce and
that the regulation of tender offers had been preempted by the federal securities laws. See pt. Ill
infra.
68. Copperweld sought an injunction in federal court based on alleged antitrust and securities
violations. Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 585-86 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
69. See, e.g., Golden Dawn Foods, Inc. v. Cekuta, 1 Ohio App. 2d 464, -, 205 N.E.2d 121,
123-24 (Ct. App. 1964).
70. Takeovers Applying "Unfriendly" Persuasion, Time, Dec. 15, 1975, at 58.
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since the target company was not incorporated in Ohio nor did it have
either its principal place of business or substantial assets in the
state-in short, it met none of the criteria. Nevertheless, the Ohio
attorney general sued to enjoin Societe Imetal until it complied with
the Ohio statute. 7 1 In support, Copperweld argued that the tender
offer was within Ohio's jurisdiction 72 because substantial assets and
operations of its two subsidiaries were tantamount to a principal place
of business of the parent. 73
The merits of this argument were never adjudicated and it remains
unclear whether substantial assets within the state provide a sufficient
jurisdictional basis under the statute. If substantial assets, standing
alone, do constitute a sufficient jurisdictional basis, the question arises
whether "substantial assets" includes a subsidiary's assets as well as
those of the parent. 74 Societe Imetal eventually consented to jurisdic-
tion and the Division of Securities entered an order stating that the
offeror had complied with the statute.
In a similar case, United Technologies Corp. made a tender offer for
fifty-five percent of the shares of Otis Elevator Company, a New
Jersey corporation. A motion by Otis for a preliminary injunction
based on alleged violations of federal law was pending in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York when Otis
invoked the Indiana takeover statute on the ground that a "substantial
portion of its total assets" was located there. 7s After (1) a cease and
desist order by the Indiana Securities Commissioner, (2) a lawsuit
commenced by Otis in state court resulting in a temporary restraining
71. Suit was commenced in the Court of Common Pleas. Ohio v. Imetal, No. 75 Civ. 09-3868
(C.P. Franklin County, Ohio, Oct. 9, 1975). At the time this suit was instituted, a suit based
upon federal law was being litigated in the Federal District Court in Pittsburgh. Copperweld
Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Although Societe Imetal was successful in
the federal case, the tender offer was delayed pending the adjudication of the Ohio suit.
72. There appears to be no precedent for imputing a parent's principal place of business from
the activities of its subsidiaries. In Inland Rubber Corp. v. Triple A Tire Serv., Inc., 220 F.
Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the only case cited by the State of Ohio involving a subsidiary, the
location of the subsidiary's principal place of business was in issue. The court determined the
answer by examining the subsidiary's activities, without considering the activities of the parent.
73. See Pre-hearing Brief of Defendants Copperweld Corp., Copperweld Steel Co. and Ohio
Steel Tube Co., Ohio v. Imetal, No. 75 Civ. 09-3868 (C.P. Ohio 197S). This argument was
apparently based upon a test set forth in Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854
(3d Cir. 1960). However, in Kelly the issue was the location of defendant's principal place of
business and the court resolved the question by looking to the place where most executive
decisions were made. The court did not mention the existence or location of subsidiaries.
74. An order dismissing the action was ultimately entered in the Court of Common Pleas. No.
75 Civ. 09-3868 (Franklin County, Ohio, 1975).
75. Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Under the Indiana statute, "substantial assets" within the state provide a sufficient jurisdictional
basis. Ind. Code § 23-2-3-1(j) (Supp. 1976).
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order, (3) an action by United in the U.S. District Court in In-
dianapolis challenging the constitutionality of the Indiana statute, (4) a
subsequent ruling by the Indiana Securities Commissioner dissolving
the cease and desist order on the ground that the statute did not apply
to Otis, (5) an action by Otis in state court to review the Commis-
sioner's ruling, (6) the expiration of the state court's temporary restrain-
ing order, (7) United's removal of all state court proceedings to the
U.S. District Court in Indianapolis, and (8) the remand of Otis' action
to the state court to review the Commissioner's ruling, the applicability
and constitutionality of the Indiana statute were still not adjudicated!
Eventually, United announced termination of its offer and its intent to
make a new offer at a higher price. 76
Imetal and United Technologies were both eventually successful in
their takeover efforts. 77 However, both illustrate one of the practical
effects of these statutes, namely, the elimination of secrecy and speed,
two major virtues of the tender offer technique of acquiring corporate
control. 78 At present, the full effects of state takeover statutes remain
unclear. This uncertainty as to their scope and effect has operated as a
strong deterrent to potential offerors. 79 When fewer states had
statutes, offerors could effectively employ the expedient of limiting
offers to states where no more restrictive regulations than the federal
scheme were in effect.80 As more laws are enacted, this tactic becomes
useless, and to avoid injunctions and other penalties an offeror, as a
practical matter, may be forced to comply with the most restrictive of
the state acts. 81
76. Troubh, Purchased affection: a primer on cash tender offers, Harv. Bus. Rev., July-Aug.
1976, at 82-83.
77. After considerable delays and legal activity in both federal and state courts, Societe
Imetal's tender offer was successful with more than two-thirds of Copperweld's stock being
purchased. Similarly, United Technologies acquired two-thirds of Otis' stock when Otis agreed to
go along with the tender offer after United had raised its bid by $2 per share. Id.
78. When a delay is obtained, more options become available to the target. In a recent bid
delayed by the Ohio procedure, Microdot, Inc. was able to arrange a friendly merger with a third
party at $21 per share while the tender offer of General Cable at $17 per share was still in court.
N.Y. Times, July 6, 1976, at 42, col. 4. Similarly, a target has more leisure to mount a
propaganda campaign of its own against the offeror's motives and abilities. See, e.g., N.Y.
Times, July 14, 1976, at 53, col. 1-2; advt., id. at 57 (campaign of opposition to exchange offer,
which was required to be announced before its effective date).
79. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1976, at 42, col. 4.
80. See, e.g., Wall St. J., March 18, 1976, at 26, col. 2 ("The Offer is not being made to...
holdersof Shares in any jurisdiction of the United States ... in which the Offer or the acceptance
thereof would not be in compliance with the securities laws of such jurisdiction.'); Wall St. J.,
Nov. 21, 1975, at 33, col. 2 (offeror gave its opinion, as part of advertised offering information,
that Indiana takeover statute was inapplicable to offer).
81. Some acts, indeed, purport to apply even where an offeror makes this kind of disclaimer.
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Case law regarding these statutes is limited, in part because they are
new, but also because the few cases filed have not been adjudicated on
the merits. Since delay so often spells failure for the offeror, few
corporations that find their offers enjoined or otherwise delayed have
the resources or the inclination to pursue legal answers that will be of
little benefit to them. Thus vital questions concerning the validity of
these laws continue to recur but to evade review. 82
The most serious questions about state takeover statutes are (1)
whether these statutes violate the commerce clause of the Constitution
and (2) whether the Williams Act has preempted state authority to
regulate in this area.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES
A. The Commerce Clause
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States"8 3 in order to
promote commercial intercourse among the states and to insure the
existence of a national economy free from unjustifiable local re-
straints.8 4 In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 8s the Supreme Court stated
the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes which affect
interstate commerce:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.8 6
For example, the Ohio act was criticized in testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs by SEC Commissioner Philip A. Loomis, Jr., this year. The
Commissioner said in essence that the statute seemed "designed to prevent an offer from being
made outside of Ohio unless and until the Ohio Act has been complied with if there are
shareholders in Ohio." CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. No. 630, Feb. 25, 1976, at 6. See also, e.g., the
Indiana act, which provides that "[a]n offeror may not make a take-over offer involving a target
company which is not made to the owners of equity securities of the target company who are
residents of this state." Ind. Code § 23-2-3-5(e) (Supp. 1976).
82. See Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 606-07 (wV.D. Pa. 1975) (district court
dissolving federal injunction noted pendency of state injunctive suit, but did not discuss conflict
with state law).
83. U.S. ConsL art. I, § 8.
84. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760 (1967); Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy,
1933-1946 (pts. 1-2), 59 Harv. L. Rev. 645, 883 (1946); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State
Power, 27 U. Va. L. Rev. 1 (1940).
85. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
86. Id. at 142. See Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 767, 772 & n.33 (1971); Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 55, at I152-53.
See generally Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 Marq. L. Rev. 687 (1975).
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Under Pike three questions must be resolved. First, does the state
statute promote a legitimate local public interest? Second, does the
statute impose a significant burden upon interstate commerce or is the
burden merely incidental? Finally, a balancing test is applied: does the
burden imposed clearly outweigh the local benefits presumably being
promoted?
1. Legitimate Local Interest
Several state interests have been advanced to justify takeover legis-
lation. The most common express legislative purpose has been the
protection of persons investing in corporations which are incorporated
within or substantially related to the enacting state.87 Through these
statutes, investors are protected from fraud"8 and from their own
imprudence in acting hastily in accepting an invitation to tender their
securities in the target corporation. This purpose of investor protection
also serves as a basis for state blue sky laws.8 9 Blue sky laws are
intended to protect resident shareholders in their transactions with all
corporations. Takeover statutes, however, regulate corporations with
certain, sometimes tenuous, local connections in order to protect both
resident and nonresident shareholders. 90 Although the takeover stat-
utes have a broader scope than blue sky laws, they are still based on a
legitimate local interest, at least insofar as they protect domestic
investors. The police power, the basis of state law, justifies the
sovereign states' regulation of widely varied activities to protect the
health and welfare of state residents. 9' However, it may be argued
that state takeover legislation cannot fairly be termed "local" within
the scope of the police power, since its benefits necessarily reach
beyond the state's boundaries.
In response to this difficulty, it has been suggested that the statutes
are grounded in the states' authority to prescribe reasonable uniform
regulation of the internal affairs of corporations incorporated under
87. The Ohio Act has as its stated purpose "to protect [all] shareholders [wherever located] of
Ohio and Ohio-based corporations by requiring public announcement and fair, full, and effective
disclosures to shareholders in regard to take-over bids." Amend. Sub. S.B. No. 138, File No. 90,
at 1 (Reg. Sess. 1969-70), cited in Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover
Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 722, 740 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Shipman]; see Vorys, Ohio Tender Offers Bill, 43 Ohio Bar 65 (1970).
88. For examples of typical antifraud provisions see Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80B.05 (Cum. Supp.
1976); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-533 (1973).
89. Loss, supra note 5, at 23 ff.
90. Freeman, Business Associations, 1969-1970, Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 56 Va.
L. Rev. 1536, 1537 (1970).
91. See cases cited in notes 136-38 infra; see generally B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law § 23
(1972).
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their laws, as when a state regulates the conduct of proxy contests of
its domestic corporations. 92 But unlike state proxy laws, which govern
the relationship between the corporation and its shareholders during
an internal struggle for corporate control, 93 state takeover statutes
regulate sales transactions to outsiders. The legal existence of any
corporation derives from a single state and that state is the source of
applicable law defining its attributes, powers and functions. Therefore,
internal procedural rules are properly the province of state law. By
contrast, a multistate tender offer has nothing to do with internal
corporate procedures. Although transfer of control is the goal in both
cases, it is accomplished in a tender offer without reference to the legal
attributes of the domestic corporation. Hence, regardless of purpose,
state regulation of an offer aimed at a domestic target is arguably
unjustifiable, at least under the "internal affairs" doctrine. 94
When a takeover statute is applied to a foreign corporation with
some connection to the state, it becomes clearer that the statutory aim
to protect shareholders wherever resident cannot be a valid local
interest. The aim is altruistic, but its supporting rationale suffers from
a conceptual inconsistency. While supporters of the statutes argue that
the state of incorporation may control internal corporate affairs, in-
cluding takeovers through the tender offer method, 95 these same
proponents contend that any state which has a significant relation-
ship 96 to a corporation may also regulate the internal affairs, by
inference all the internal affairs, of that corporation. 97 Conflicts would
certainly result if several states attempted to assert jurisdiction over
the internal affairs of one corporation. This demonstrates that the
92. E.g., Shipman, supra note 87, at 744-45. See also Vorys, Ohio Tender Offers Bill, 43
Ohio Bar 65 (1970).
93. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 212 (1974). In proxy fights, "[oinly the right to vote is
transferred among existing shareholders." Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 5S, at 1154.
94. Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 55, at 1154-SS. But cf. Shipman, supra note
87, at 744-45, where it is argued that at least in the case of a successful tender offer, the
similarities to a proxy solicitation are sufficient to permit state regulation. This argument is
strengthened by Congress' finding, in studying the Williams Act, that takeover bids are function-
ally similar to proxy fights. H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968).
95. See notes 92-94 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
97. See Shipman, supra note 87, at 755. State regulation of the internal affairs of a corporation
carrying on a substantial part of its operations in a state other than its state of incorporation is
justified on the ground that in many cases corporations have only nominal connection with their
state of incorporation while operating elsewhere. Id. at 752. While this is often true, since the
state of incorporation has authorized the creation of a corporation and has ultimate power over its
corporate existence, the better view is that, for consistency, that state alone should be responsible
for controlling corporate activities which touch upon the internal control of the corporation. See
Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 55, at 1155-57.
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assertion that takeover statutes are in the best interest of investors9" is
unrealistic.
"Protection of investors," like much of the language in blue sky laws
and the takeover statutes, is borrowed from the Securities Exchange
Act 99 as an express purpose for the legislation. However, other consid-
erations plainly have entered into the proposal and enactment of
takeover laws. In a few cases these considerations are express. But the
search for legislative intent does not end with legislative policy declara-
tions. If the statute's practical operation exhibits an unstated purpose
underlying its enactment, a court may examine that purpose when
evaluating the statute's validity. 100
It has been observed that "[a] number of states apparently feared
that established local concerns might, through the tender offer device,
be taken over by outside interests who would then close down plants
and leave local residents jobless."''1 Recently, at least two statutes
have included this concern over jobs as an express purpose of the
legislation. ' 02 This purpose may also be inferred from the fact that the
majority of acts exempt offers approved by management.10 3
In response to this threat, the state legislatures have apparently
sought to protect existing management from ouster or the reorganiza-
tion that might follow a successful, unfriendly tender offer. State
legislation which aims to promote employment opportunities for its
residents is clearly local in character and seems a legitimate exercise of
the general police power. This point must be recognized despite the
fact that its main advocates are often present management concerned
more about their own jobs than about the state's economic welfare. 0 4
98. See text accompanying notes 87-91 supra.
99. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1970).
100. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1970); Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928).
101. Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
767, 768 (1971); see Corporate Control, supra note 2, at 172; Commerce Clause Limitations,
supra note 55, at 1157-58.
102. Pa. Pub. L. No. 1106, § 2 (2 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 41,182 (March 3, 1976)). The
preamble to the Tennessee Act cites the possible adverse effect of the transfer of corporate assets
or suspension of operations after a takeover. Tenn. S. Bill No. 1707 (1976), enacted as Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 48-2101-2115 (3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 45,191-205 (March 17, 1976)).
103. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
104. In at least some states, the takeover statutes are a form of special interest legislation. For
example, in early 1969, B.F. Goodrich, an Ohio manufacturer, having successfully repelled a
takeover by Northwest Industries, joined with the Ohio Manufacturers Association to draft state
legislation which would delay or block takeovers of corporations located in Ohio. Fortune, July,
1969, at 110. See also Norris, The Robber Barons of Today, Wall St. J., May 11, 1976, at 22,
col. 4-6 (recommendation that corporations seek state legislation); Ruthlessness by the Rules,
Forbes, Feb. 1, 1976, at 27-28; Wysocki, The Delaying Game, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1975, at 26,
col. 2 (Idaho statute sponsored by Morrison-Knudsen Co.).
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The legislature may fairly be interested in perpetuating the tenure of
those managers who favor doing business in the state. That this is a
legitimate state interest appears by analogy to several states' favorable
corporation laws'0 s under which a company may find advantages.
10 6
Further reasons for these statutes have been expressed by a few
legislatures and probably considered by others. These include the
adverse economic effect on business, apart from unemployment, suf-
fered when a large corporation leaves a state, as well as losses,
presumably of tax revenues, which would result should the "offeror
transfer [the target] company's assets out of [the] state."10 7 Such losses
would have unfavorable domestic effects and their prevention is
certainly desirable in the state's view.
2. Extraterritorial Effect
Most takeover statutes apply not only to corporations formed under
a state's laws, but also to companies which have their principal place
of business or substantial assets, or both, within the jurisdiction. 10
They also affect shareholders domiciled outside the state. 109 Although
a state may have only minimal contact with a foreign corporation or
shareholder, the terms of some takeover statutes permit the state to
105. See, e.g., the Delaware and New Jersey corporation laws generally, Del. Code Ann. tit.
8 (1974); N.J. Stat. Ann. tit. 14A (1969).
106. Just as corporations "migrated" to pro-management states in the early 1900's, see Louis
K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541, 557-64 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); W. Cary,
Corporations 9-13 (4th unabridged ed. 1969), corporations fearful of imminent tenders have
recently been changing their states of incorporation, see Wysocki, The Delaying Game, Wall St.
J., Nov. 19, 1975, at 26, col. 1, with the effect of spurring competitive enactment by still more
states.
107. Preamble, Tenn. S. Bill No. 1707, enacted Mar. 17, 1976; see, e.g., Utah S. Bill No. 10,
§ 2 (3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 47,337 (February 5, 1976)).
105. E.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 522.01(6) (Supp. 1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1707.041(A)(1)
(Page Supp. 1976). This raises the question of how much of a company's assets are "substantial"
for determining when the statute will apply. Ultimately this must be a question for the courts, but
in the meantime a state securities commission is free to define "substantial assets" and, in the final
analysis, to control the progress of pending tender offers. In December, General Cable Corp., a
Connecticut company, offered to buy a controlling amount of shares of Microdot, Inc., another
Connecticut corporation. Alicrodot strenuously resisted this attempt. One defensive step it took
was to invoke the protection of the Ohio tender offer act. The Ohio Division of Securities ruled
that since Microdot had substantial assets in Ohio, General Cable's tender offer was within its
jurisdiction. General Cable agreed to proceed with its tender offer in accordance with the Ohio
statutory requirements and the findings of hearings on the offer. Meanwhile, Northwest Indus-
tries, Inc., hitherto uninvolved in this matter, announced its plans to make a tender offer for 51%
of Microdot's common shares, offering four dollars more per share than General Cable. Wall St.
J., Jan. 27, 1975, at 2, col. 2.
109. See, e.g., Sommer, The Ohio Takeover Act: What Is It?, 21 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 681
(1970).
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undertake substantial regulation of their affairs. 10 This extensive
extraterritorial control distinguishes state takeover statutes from state
blue sky laws. The latter govern the sale of securities exclusively
within one state, requiring sellers to disclose information designed to
provide the investing public with a basis upon which to make an
informed investment decision."'
Early challenges to blue sky laws upheld intrastate regulation of
securities on the basis that a state has the power to protect its residents
from fraudulent stock offers.11 2 However, as the scope of "interstate
commerce" has widened, 113 it has become increasingly difficult to
claim that any activity, particularly a securities transaction, is wholly
intrastate and hence within the exclusive province of the states.
Consequently, it has been urged that blue sky laws should be abolished
or made uniform 1 4 since they have many interstate effects, and claims
to jurisdiction under them have come to depend somewhat artificially
upon the place where a sale is said to occur. 115 Whatever the argu-
ments for restricting blue sky laws, they apply with even greater force
to state takeover statutes, which present far greater impediments to
interstate commerce. Not only may they affect a remote shareholder's
ability to sell his shares, or the affairs of a corporation with minimal
local contacts; but the action taken by one state in respect to a tender
110. See summary of testimony of SEC Commissioner Loomis, note 81 supra. Societe Imetal's
attempt to take over Copperweld exemplifies remote extraterritorial control. Although two of
Copperweld's subsidiaries were incorporated in Ohio, Copperweld itself was not even licensed to
do business there. See Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
Ironically, Pennsylvania, which was the target's principal place of business and state of
incorporation, had, prior to this case, considered legislation similar to the Ohio takeover act, but
decided against adoption. Pennsylvania has since enacted such a statute. Pa. Pub. L. No. 1106 (2
CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 1 41,181-196 (March 3, 1976)).
111. For an exhaustive study of state blue sky laws see Loss, supra note 5, at 23-107,
112. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 644 (1950); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.,
242 U.S. 539, 552 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 564 (1917);
Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 586 (1917). See generally Loss, supra note 5, at
33-43.
113. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974). In this case, cotton to be
delivered to a warehouse located in the same state as the farm upon which it was grown was held
within interstate commerce because delivery to the warehouse where cotton was sorted and
classified was essential for completion of what would eventually be an interstate transaction. Id.
at 30.
114. Arguments for abolition are discussed in Loss, supra note 5, at 102-03; the Uniform
Securities Act is examined id. at 90-105. After an extensive study of blue sky laws, two securities
experts concluded that all such legislation should be discarded, since even the most simplistic
securities transactions within a state utilize interstate facilities. L. Loss & E. Cowett, Blue Sky
Law (1958).
115. See, e.g., Kreis v. Mates Inv. Fund, Inc., 473 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1973).
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offer may also disrupt trading and the orderly regulation of the
national securities market."16
In addition, takeover legislation burdens remote offerors, who can-
not proceed with the offer until they have complied with the pre-filing,
disclosure, and hearing requirements of each state whose statute
purports to control bids for the target. The conflicts among the state
statutes to which the offeror is subject 1 7 demonstrate their extrater-
ritorial effect. Similarly, in the Copperweld case,' " 8 concurrent regula-
tion of a tender offer resulted in a stand-off between a state and a
federal court. Copperweld's injunction request was denied by a federal
judge, but was granted by a state judge with the result that the tender
offer effective in all states was suspended until the state takeover
requirements were met. 119 The commerce clause was aimed at pre-
venting such unilateral action by a state.' 2 0
3. Excessive Burden on Interstate Commerce
The final Pike criterion is whether the burden the state legislation
places on interstate commerce is clearly excessive compared to the
putative local benefits. 12 1 The Court in Pike noted that such an effect
116. See New York Stock Exchange review of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1707.041 (Page Supp.
1975), in B.N.A. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 1, at A-12 (June 4, 1969); notes 56-59 supra and
accompanying text.
117. Delaware requires that an offer be made not less than 20 nor more than 60 days after
delivery of a statement of intent to make an offer. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (I CCH Blue
Sky L. Rep. 11,131 (May 1, 1976)). If an offer is made for shares of a Delaware corporation
with substantial assets in Ohio, the hearings which might be required by Ohio, see text
accompanying notes 48-50 supra, could delay the offer's effective date beyond the period in which
the offer would comply with Delaware law.
Another uncertain situation has arisen concerning the shareholders' right to wvithdraw tendered
shares. All the statutes except Ohio's have some provision on this point. Although some statutes
conform to the provision in the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1970), for withdrawal during
the first seven days or after 60 days, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80B.06(2) (Cum. Supp 1976),
others provide inconsistent rights. E.g., Ind. Code § 23-2-3-5 (Supp. 1976) permits withdrawal
of the shares any time up to a few days before the expiration of the offer.
118. Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975); see text accompanying
notes 68-74 supra.
119. See notes 68-74 supra and accompanying text.
120. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16 (1928). In
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928), the Court invalidated state regulation
or prohibition of exportation of shellfish taken from coastal waters. The real purpose behind the
state statute was to protect the local canning and manufacturing industries. However, since the
shellfish was not kept for the exclusive use of state residents but shipped out of state, the Court
determined this economic favoritism unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. See also
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
121. 397 U.S. at 142. This balancing test is generally traceable to Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), in which the direct regulation of train lengths was
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had been "declared to be virtually per se illegal"'122 in prior cases. In
Pike, Arizona required cantaloupes produced in Arizona to be packed
within the state for the declared purpose of enhancing the reputation of
the Arizona cantaloupe industry. This requirement caused severe
hardship to at least one producer, who would have had to build a
packing plant in Arizona rather than merely ship to a plant a few miles
away in California. Construing Arizona's law to be analogous to an
unconstitutional attempt to promote local employment at the expense
of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court struck down the statute as
an undue burden on commerce even though a legitimate state purpose
was being furthered. 123
Since the takeover statutes operate to shield state residents and
incumbent management by imposing regulations which so delay the
tender offer as to threaten the offer's success, the statutes place a
burden on commerce so excessive as to suggest their invalidity.' 24 It
must be noted in addition that in the case of statutes which do not
exempt "friendly" offers 125 from their scope, the method chosen to
protect state interests puts a different burden on interstate commerce.
Unlike laws that use positive provisions, such as tax and other
incentives, to attract and keep business in the state, such takeover
laws suggest that there exists state power to prevent the voluntary
emigration of domestic corporations. Such an assertion cannot survive
commerce clause scrutiny. Even if the states are pursuing legitimate
local interests, the extraterritorial control exerted by such statutes
held to be an unconstitutional burden on the flow of commerce since the prospect that each state
might mandate different maximum lengths was potentially hazardous to interstate commerce. In
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), actual conflicts among the states did
arise with respect to the shape of mudguards on trucks using state highways. Delays caused by
the necessity of changing mudguards at state lines were held an unconstitutional burden on
commerce. See Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 1762, 1778 (1974).
122. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970).
123. Id. at 145-46.
124. The commerce clause has been held to prohibit a state from imposing standards on
carriers, for example, if the rules would substantially delay the flow of goods through the stream
of interstate commerce. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (specialized
truck mudguards required while driving through state); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (state regulation of train length). Arguably, however, state takeover
statutes regulate activities before the operation of commerce begins (i.e., before the tender offer is
effective) and consequently, state regulation is permissible. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238 (1936). As a practical matter, this is not necessarily true. In the Copperweld case, for
example, the offers were outstanding when the Ohio statute was invoked. See notes 67-68 supra
and accompanying text.
125. These presently include Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Utah.
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demonstrates the need for uniform regulation of tender offers in order
to insure the smooth flow of interstate commerce.' 26
Absent a tender offer fight, the burden an individual statute places
on the progress of a tender offer may itself be minimal. However, if
several state statutes apply concurrently or consecutively to an offer,
the conflicts existing among state provisions 127 and with the federal
system may reduce the usefulness of tender offers and disrupt the
regularity of trading on the national markets. The resulting interfer-
ence with interstate commerce indicates that these statutes conflict
with the commerce clause and are therefore unconstitutional.
B. The Preemption Doctrine
The supremacy clause128 of the Constitution and the preemption
doctrine have been used interchangeably as a means of finding over-
reaching state laws unconstitutional. 129 Under the supremacy clause, a
state law is invalid when it conflicts directly with federal law, thus
rendering compliance with both impossible. 130 Under the preemption
doctrine, however, direct conflict is unneccessary; 131 a state law
exhibiting a purpose which is valid, and perhaps even consistent with
federal legislation, may nevertheless be invalid where its effect is to
pose an "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."' 32
126. See Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 55, at 1173.
127. These conflicts are separately discussed in notes 117 supra, 172-79 infra and accompany-
ing text.
128. The supremacy clause of the Constitution provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
129. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725
(1949); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). Lack of judicial distinction between
the supremacy clause and preemption may account for the confusion which surrounds them. The
scope of these two constitutional doctrines has been discussed in Freeman, Dynamic Federalism
and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DePaul L. Rev. 630 (1972); Comment, A Conceptual
Refinement of the Doctrine of Federal Preemption, 22 J. Pub. L. 391 (1973).
130. See, e.g., Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DePaul L.
Rev. 630, 636 n.34 (1972); Comment, A Conceptual Refinement of the Doctrine of Federal
Preemption, 22 J. Pub. L. 391, 396 (1973).
131. See Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DePaul L. Rev.
630, 636 n.34 (1972); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 623, 636 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Preemption Doctrine]. See
generally Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 515; Note,
Federal Pre-emption of State Laws: The Effect of Regulatory Agency Attitudes on Judicial
Decisionmaking, 50 Ind. L.J. 848 (1975).
132. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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These two constitutional principles should be distinguished. 133 The
preemption doctrine is broader in scope, as it not only invalidates the
specific law at issue but also negates the states' power to regulate in the
field. The Supreme Court has always approached questions of preemp-
tion on a case-by-case basis, so that a single formula for predicting
whether a state law will be preempted cannot be established.1 34 The
trend in the Court, however, has been away from preempting the
states in the absence of a clear congressional mandate to that effect. 135
Such a -mandate might be found in the express provisions of a
statute, 136 although it is more likely that an exclusionary intent on the
part of Congress would be found in the legislative history of an act. It
is possible that the intent to exclude could be inferred from a detailed,
comprehensive legislative scheme 137 or from the need to promote a
uniform national policy. This latter need can be expressed or inferred
from the subject matter of the regulation. 138 It is important, however,
133. See, e.g., Comment, A Conceptual Refinement of the Doctrine of Federal Preemption,
21 J. Pub. L. 391, 394-97 (1973).
134. See generally Preemption Doctrine, supra note 131.
135. The guidelines established by the Court can be roughly classified into three periods:
(1) During the 1930s, the Court required a showing that Congress expressly intended to occupy
a field. E.g., Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940); H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire,
306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939); Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937); Mlintz v.
Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933). During this period state interests were supported, excluding
federal objectives in the process. A presumption of validity of state laws exercising the police
power was created.
(2) Starting in the 1940s, the Court began to infer a congressional intent from the pervasiveness
of federal legislation. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1941); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956);
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973); see Preemption Doctrine,
supra note 131, at 636-39. See generally Note, "Occupation of the Field" in Commerce Clause
Cases, 1936-1946: Ten Years of Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 262 (1946). In this "Federal
period," federal interests were regarded as paramount.
(3) Most recently, the Court appears to be shifting back to requiring a direct showing of
congressional intent, which may be evidenced by the statutory language or legislative purpose.
See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546 (1973); New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-52 (1963). For a complete discussion of this movement
see Preemption Doctrine, supra note 131, at 639-54.
136. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). See also Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Baltimore Natl Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 209
(1936). This express language may take the form of a "preemption clause."
137. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (lack of express
preemption provision not decisive); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
138. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 167 (1942) (renovated butter industry
cannot be effectively regulated by isolated competing states because of its multi-state activity).
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to recognize that the Court will no longer preempt a state law merely
because Congress may have regulated "in the field." 13 9
State blue sky laws and federal regulation of securities have
coexisted for many years, the Supreme Court having long ago, prior to
the securities acts, held that such state legislation was constitu-
tional. 14 0 This is so, however, only in the absence of conflict. As
section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any
agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security or any
person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder.
14 1
Even if this is not express preemption, the state tender offer statutes
seem to be preempted under two other standards 147-the existence of a
dominant federal interest or national policy, and the presence of
federal regulation so pervasive one can infer the intent to exclude state
regulation. 143 Finally, apart from these judicial tests, state provisions
in actual conflict with federal law must be preempted pro tanto.
1. Federal Exclusion of State Control:
National Policy and Dominant Federal Interest
Congress has not expressly forbidden the states to regulate tender
offers. 144 However, pre-effective filing, hearing and extensive disclo-
139. Cf. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
140. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917) (Ohio); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917) (S.D.); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) (Mich. blue
sky law).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
142. SEC Commissioner Loomis testified before a Senate committee recently to his belief the
Williams Act preempts state power in the field of tender offers. CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. No. 630,
Feb. 25, 1976, at 6.
143. These two tests are used when Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the
states. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). See
also Comment, A Conceptual Refinement of the Doctrine of Federal Preemption, 22 J. Pub. L.
391, 392 (1973); Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12
Stan. L. Rev. 208 (1959). Once it is determined that Congress intended to achieve one uniform
system of regulation, the test becomes "whether the matter on which the State asserts the right to
act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act. If it is, the federal scheme prevails though it is a
more modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than that of the State." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., supra, at 236.
144. Of course, when Congress was considering the Williams Act no state takeover statutes
had been enacted or even proposed. Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender
Offers, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 767 (1971); Sommer, The Ohio Takeover Act: What Is It?, 21 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 681 (1970).
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sure requirements of state takeover statutes, viewed in light of the
history of the Williams Act, plainly interfere with Congress' overall
design for securities regulation, since Congress explicitly rejected such
provisions.
When a tender offer was made prior to the Williams Act, a security
holder could sell all of his holdings, or he could sell only a portion of
them and remain a shareholder in the old company "under a new
management which he ... helped to install without knowing whether
it [would] be good or bad for the company. ' 145 The Williams Act
sought to provide the shareholder with knowledge of the identity of the
offeror and of its plans and intentions regarding the target company's
future. The minimal disclosure requirements of the Act provide share-
holders with the information necessary to make an informed decision
regarding the sale of their equity interests in the target. In providing
for this disclosure, Congress drafted the bill without prejudice against
the tender offer as a method of achieving the transfer of corporate
ownership. The House and Senate committees reported that "[tihe bill
avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management
or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. It is designed to
require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the
same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to
fairly present their case.' 1 46
The Williams Act was originally drafted to require the offeror to file
with the SEC a confidential disclosure statement at least five days
before the commencement of the offer. 147 The SEC favored pre-
effective filing, patterned on the procedure in proxy contests, "since it
would give the Commission an opportunity to review the statement
and point out any inaccuracies or inadequacies before any soliciting
material was published or sent to stockholders.' 1 48 However, during
Senate hearings, critics voiced their disapproval of any pre-effective
filing and scrutiny by the SEC. Representatives of the major stock
145. H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1968); S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967).
146. H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968); S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1967). Manuel F. Cohen, then Chairman of the SEC, testified before the Senate that the
Williams Act "is designed solely . . . to fill the gap in the provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to cover planned acquisitions of large blocks of securities of publicly held companies,
where control of the company may be at stake. It is not intended to encourage or to discourage
such activity or to provide management or any other group with special privileges over any
other." Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. See also
Wall St. 3., March 22, 1967, at 2, col. 4.
147. S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)
148. Testimony of Manuel F. Cohen, Senate Hearings, supra note 146, at 20.
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exchanges were concerned that leaks which might occur before the
tender offer was made would force its abandonment. Other concerns
were expressed as well. 149 New York Stock Exchange Vice-President
Donald L. Calvin testified that:
The prefiling proposal might also provide an opportunity for market manipulations.
An information statement might be filed solely to provide the basis for rumors of an
impending offer for a company [by someone] without any intention of making the
offer. The price manipulation could then take place, and it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to prove that such manipulation was intended.'"
Mr. Calvin also pointed out that
if word of the impending offer becomes public, the price of the stock will rise toward
the expected tender price. Thus, the primary inducement to stockholders, an offer to
purchase their shares at an attractive price above the market, is lost, and the offeror
may be forced to abandon its plan or to raise the offer to a still higher price. The cost
of an offer to purchase hundreds of thousands of shares might prove prohibitive if the
price had to be increased only a few dollars per share."'
Opposition to the five-day period during which the SEC would
review an offeror's information statement continued throughout the
hearings. The bill was amended to delete the five-day waiting" period
and was finally passed by the Senate with the present language, as
suggested by the New York Stock Exchange. 1s2
The following year a similar bill was the subject of House hear-
ings.1 5 3 As introduced, it required an offeror to file an information
statement with the SEC five days before commencement of the of-
fer.154 The chairman of the SEC, though recognizing that the New
York Stock Exchange recommendations to the contrary had been
persuasive to the drafters of the Senate bill,15s again testified in favor
of this requirement. S6 Again, the critics spoke out against it for the
149. Testimony of Donald L. Calvin, Vice President, New York Stock Exchange, id. at
69-79; Testimony of Ralph S. Saul, President, American Stock Exchange, id. at 96-98; Testimony
of Robert W. Haack, President, National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, id. at 106-108.
150. Testimony of Donald L. Calvin, id. at 75.
151. Id. at 72. See Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 Marq. L. Rev. 687, 688-89
(1975).
152. S. 510, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
153. H.R. 14475, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
154. Id.
155. Testimony of Manuel F. Cohen, Hearings on H.R. 14475, S. 510 Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1968). Mr. Calvin put his suggestion simply when he stated. "We urge...
that market disruptions must be avoided and that this can best be accomplished by requiring the
statement to be filed when the offer is commenced." Id. at 76.
156. Id. at 10.
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same reasons given before the Senate subcommittee.' 5 7 The bill was
amended and passed without the five-day provision. 158 Most recently,
a bill was introduced in the first session of the Ninety-Fourth Congress
requiring filing sixty days before commencement of tender offers.' 5 9
This bill has not been reported out of committee. 160
The legislative history of the Williams Act and of the attempts to
amend it clearly shows that when Congress was faced with the choice
of requiring an information statement to be filed some time before the
effective date of an offer in order to give the SEC time to examine the
adequacy of disclosure, or of requiring the statement to be filed when
the offer is commenced, it preferred the latter. Thus, Congress pur-
posefully chose not to require any pre-effective disclosure. 161 This
repeated rejection, coupled with the explicit reason given therefor,
namely fairness to both sides in tender offers, amounts to a clear
national policy in the field.
The views of Congress on the advisability of further predisclosure
and review became clearer when analogous legislation seeking predis-
closure in proposed mergers was also offered in the Ninety-Fourth
Congress. 162 Although these proposed amendments to the antitrust
laws were primarily concerned with large acquisitions, not particularly
tender offers, the policy arguments were analogous. In support of
pre-merger notification the argument was made that after-the-fact
remedies are inadequate, principally because once the merger is com-
plete, the status quo is difficult to restore. 163 On the other hand,
such automatic prior restraint could be viewed as an unjustified
burden on business because it would delay business transactions
without adequate reason for belief that violations of the law might
occur. 164 Faced with choosing between these two policy arguments,
both houses passed the amendments in diluted form.' 65 However, the
157. See, e.g., testimony of Donald L. Calvin, id. at 43-46.
158. 113 Cong. Rec. 24662 (1967).
159. S. 2522, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1975).
160. See 2 CCH Congressional Index S 2116 (1976).
161. See notes 148-60 supra and accompanying text.
162. S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 14580, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). In the
past, such proposals have never gone further than passage by one house of Congress. S. Rep. No.
803 (pt. 1), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 n.28 (1976) (noting passage by the House and by various
committees on six prior occasions).
163. S. Rep. No. 803 (pt. 1), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64-66 (1976) (noting support of Asst.
Attorney General Thomas E. Kauper); Hearings on S. 39 Before the Antitrust and Monopoly
Subcomm. of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 94-95 (1976).
164. S. Rep. No. 803 (pt. 1), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976).
165. See N.Y. Times, June 11, 1976, at D-1, col. 1, D-5, col. 3; Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1976, at
2, col. 2.
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major policy argument applicable to tender offers was inapplicable
here: the acquiring corporation is not vitally dependent upon maintain-
ing secrecy prior to a public announcement as is the case with tender
offers, particularly "unfriendly" ones. Hence Congress' approval of
these measures does not detract from the conclusion that a national
policy exists, shown by Congress' acts in the area, in favor of avoiding
arbitrary impediments to corporate acquisitions. This policy should be
given full effect in tender offer regulation, where it can be vital to the
success of an acquisition.
While the history of the Williams Act clearly indicates an express
rejection of pre-effective filing, 166 it does not reveal explicit rejection of
two other requirements found in some state statutes, namely (1)
hearings held prior to the tender offer taking effect or (2) disclosure of
information in the detail of an S-1 registration statement.1 67 These
possibilities were not proposed in Congress, so the absence of commit-
tee reports rejecting them cannot resolve the question whether the state
enactments are preempted. But their purpose and effect are so similar
to the pre-effective filing requirement that Congress' rationale concern-
ing "tipping the balance"'168 seems equally applicable. It can be argued
that the more elaborate disclosure contemplated in statements of the
S-1 variety does not conffict substantially with the federal scheme. 1
6 9
However, this is true only where advance filing is not required.
2. Pervasive Federal Regulation
A second judicial basis for finding federal preemption is where
federal regulation in an area is so pervasive that intent to preempt can
be inferred therefrom. 170 It may be argued that, on its face, the
Williams Act is not a "pervasive" scheme to regulate tender offers since
it merely mandates the timing and content of disclosure. However, the
sections were integrated by Congress into the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, which in effect controls every other facet of tender offers.
Taken as a whole, that Act is certainly comprehensive. Moreover, the
166. See notes 145-61 supra and accompanying text.
167. See notes 42-43 supra.
168. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
169. Indeed, the target company could no longer delay the offer by charging that the
disclosure requirements were not met unless it utilized the traditional method of seeking a
preliminary injunction, see Note, Tender Offer Regulation-Injunction Standards Under the
Williams Act, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 51 (1976). Microdot, Inc., was successful in delaying General
Cable's tender offer by petitioning the Obio Division of Securities to examine General Cable's
filing forms for "full and fair disclosure." See note 108 supra. Moreover, the SEC recently moved
to impose stricter disclosure requirements under the Williams Act. N.Y. Times, July 1S, 1976, at
51, col. 6.
170. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
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regulation of the timing of disclosure in tender offers is no mere
procedural detail. Concurrent disclosure was found by Congress to be
the only fair way to regulate tender offers, since advance disclosure
gives such an advantage to the target company and severely limits the
usefulness of the tender offer technique. 171 It may thus be said that the
timing of disclosure has a substantive effect on tender offers, and
hence that Congress' delineation of one method was intended not as a
minimum standard but as the standard to be applicable in every state.
3. Direct Conflict with the Williams Act
In addition to frustrating the overall plan and intent of Congress,
some provisions of state takeover statutes are in direct conflict with
federal securities law, 172 regarding the duties of both the tenderer and
the offeror.
For example, section 14(d)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934173 permits securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer to be
withdrawn during the first seven days of the offer or after sixty days if
the securities have been neither purchased nor returned. Several states
have enacted takeover statutes which directly conflict with these provi-
sions. For example, the Colorado statute permits the offeree to with-
draw deposited securities "within fifteen days after the date of the first
invitation to deposit securities and at any time after thirty-five days
after the date of the first invitation to deposit securities. ' 174 Indiana
extends the time within which securities may be withdrawn "to the
third day prior to the announced termination date [of the offer]." 175
Such provisions may place the offeree (state resident or otherwise) in a
position in which he is acting rightfully pursuant to a state law while
he is in violation of federal law.
Conflicts have also been created in which the offeror while abiding
by the federal law will violate the state law. The Nevada act provides
that:
Where a takeover bid is made for less than all the shares of a class and where a greater
number of shares is deposited pursuant thereto than the offeror is bound or willing to
take up and pay for, the shares taken up by the offeror shall be taken up as nearly as
171. See text accompanying notes 146-52 supra.
172. See N.Y. Times, July 6, 1976, at 41, col. 7; 42, col. 4.
173. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1970).
174. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11.51.5-103(I)(c) (1 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 9153 (July 1,
1975)).
175. Ind. Code § 23-2-3-5(a) (Supp. 1976). Of the states which have enacted takeover
legislation, at least six (Colorado, Indiana, Hawaii, Kansas, Virginia, and Nevada) provide
extensions or potential extensions (depending upon when an offer is scheduled to terminate)
beyond those provided by the Williams Act.
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may be pro rata, disregarding fractions, according to the number of shares depos-
ited.1 76
Offerors subject to the jurisdiction of the Nevada takeover statute
must prorate tenders for the life of the offer, 17 7 whereas the Williams
Act requires that only those securities which are tendered within the
first ten days of the offer must be purchased on a pro rata basis.1 78
Those tendered after that time may be accepted on a first-come,
first-served basis. 179 But a shareholder who tenders after the first ten
days, and whose shares are not taken up, can assert a right under state
law to have his shares prorated, and an offeror could thus be required
to purchase substantially more shares than it wanted.
While the differences between the federal and state statutes may
seem trivial, the practical effect of these variations in the context of a
tender offer is to pose such burdens and uncertainties as to threaten the
viability of any offer. Under the supremacy clause the individual
substantive provisions of state takeover statutes which directly clash
with the Williams Act must give way to a national and uniform system
of regulating tender offers.18 0
176. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.3772(3) (1973).
177. Other states which have similar provisions are Colorado, Indiana and Virginia. Hawaii
has avoided this problem by mandating that a tender offer as defined by statute may not be made
for less than all the outstanding equity securities of a class. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 417E-2 (Supp.
1975).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1970).
179. The Williams Act as first proposed required proration of all securities tendered when an
offer is made for less than all outstanding equity shares of a class and more than that number are
tendered. S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Dissatisfaction with this provision was voiced
during the Senate and House hearings: "This provision offers the advantage of avoiding undue
haste in making a decision to accept a tender proposal. It also offers the advantage of treating all
selling stockholders on an equal basis, and affords an opportunity for news of the tender offer to
circulate without prejudice to holders who do not immediately learn of it.
"On the other hand, it tends to put a premium on delay and may not be fair to the selling
stockholder who makes up his mind with reasonable promptness.
"Further, it may conflict with the decision of the stockholder who wishes to sell his holdings on
an all-or-none basis.
"Balancing the various considerations, we would suggest that thought be given to requiring pro
rata treatment for a reasonable period while permitting acceptance on a first-come, first-served
basis, during the balance of the tender period or any extension, if the terms of the tender offer so
provided." Testimony of Ralph S. Saul, Hearings on H. 14475, S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 99-100 (1968). If the state pro rata provisions which substantially differ from the federal
provisions survive a constitutional attack based on the actual conflict presented, they must fail on
the ground that they frustrate a clear congressional design. See notes 145-65 supra and
accompanying text.
180. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As the economic and corporate development of this country has
progressed, transactions involving securities have become more sophis-
ticated and the tender offer has become a viable means by which
corporate control can be changed. There can be no doubt that it is
necessary to regulate securities transactions. The federal government
has imposed such regulation through comprehensive enactments, in-
cluding the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and the Williams Act.
The states' adoption of further regulation in the tender offer field has
made it increasingly difficult for an acquiring company to rely on the
tender offer as a device for effecting a smooth transfer of corporate
control. The pre-effective disclosure and hearing requirements pur-
suant to these state statutes frustrate the Congressional design of the
Williams Act. In addition, some takeover act provisions directly
conflict with the provisions of the Williams Act. Even if the state
statutes protect legitimate public interests, their operation unconstitu-
tionally burdens the flow of interstate commerce in a field which
requires uniform regulation. The authors suggest that the time has
come, in light of the need for uniformity in this field, for Congress to
preempt expressly the asserted power of th'e states to impose inconsis-
tent regulatory schemes in the field of tender offers.
[As this Article went to press, H.R. 8532, known as the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Bill of 1976, had been amended and
passed by both houses of Congress. As amended, the final bill required
30 days notice in advance of significant mergers and 15 days advance
filing in cash tender offers.]
